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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Intermeddlers would have no such connection or arguable
interest.
Interestingly, had Springfield remained silent, the subroga-
tion would not have been before the court, and the plaintiff
might have been successful in his action to recover damages.
Springfield then could have recovered the money from the plain-
tiff, who would hold it only as constructive trustee.14
If this decision is followed, total subrogees, as the proper
parties to sue, will not be able to take advantage of suits filed
by the subrogor by adding themselves as party plaintiffs through
amendment. The court has given the words of the Code a literal
interpretation and has thereby prevented the subrogor's suit
from having any effect.
Sidney M. Blitzer, Jr.
CONFLICT OF LAws-RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
DIVORCE DECREES
Wife sued to have a certain immovable declared her sepa-
rate property. Prior to its purchase both wife and defendant-
husband had gone to Mexico and within three days secured
divorces from their respective spouses and married each other.
The parties returned to Louisiana to live, later secured Louisiana
divorces from their "former" spouses and were married in a
Louisiana ceremony. The property in question, however, was
purchased prior to the Louisiana ceremony. Held, the immov-
able was the wife's separate property. The Mexican divorces and
marriage were invalid, therefore no community of acquets and
gains existed between the parties at the time of the purchase.
Although the court was unable to locate a single pertinent Lou-
isiana case, it reasoned that since Louisiana courts are not
required by the full faith and credit clause to recognize divorces
granted in foreign countries it follows, a fortiori, that such
divorces, which do not meet the standards required for recogni-
tion of divorces granted by sister states, need not be recognized.
Under the full faith and credit clause a divorce granted in a
sister state is entitled to recognition only when one of the
parties is domiciled there. Neither the parties nor their spouses
14. Moncrieff v. Lacobie, 89 So.2d 471, 474-75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
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were domiciled in Mexico when the divorces were obtained.
Clark v. Clark, 192 So.2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Con-
stitution does not require the states to recognize divorces ob-
tained in foreign countries. Each state, therefore, is in a posi-
tion similar to that of a sovereign nation as to whether or not
it will recognize such divorces. The issue is one to be resolved
by application of principles of private international law. A court
must seek the sources of this law in treaties; the local law with
respect to what should be done in international questions; inter-
national custom; or reasonable principles of legislative and
judicial jurisdiction. No treaty exists between the United States
and Mexico on the recognition of divorce judgments, nor is
there any Louisiana legislation on the subject, and international
custom varies. In cases of this kind, therefore, the Louisiana
judiciary should act according to its best judgment in the light
of reasonable principles of legislative and judicial competence.
Basically, there are two approaches to the question of who
has jurisdiction.' One view is that each state or nation is free
to decide for itself, solely as a political question, over which
matters it will assert jurisdiction. The criteria by which it
claims jurisdiction may be eminently just and reasonable
or totally perverse and irrational. On the other hand, some
recognize that states are limited in their exercise of jurisdiction
and that there are certain reasonable standards by which the
appropriate extent of a state's jurisdiction is to be determined.
States are free to adopt different criteria by which they assert
jurisdiction, but these criteria are dependent upon reasonable-
ness and appropriateness for their validity.2
1. 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 6-11 (2d ed.
1958) distinguishes primarily between "internationalists," i.e., those visual-
izing an international law of legislative and judicial competence, and "na-
tionalists," i.e., those treating these matters as a branch of the national law.
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 775
(1955), takes the position that the framers of the United States Constitution
based the full faith and credit clause on their acceptance of the tradition
of a "Law of Nations" (Jus Gentium) supplying principles limiting states
in the exercise of legislative and judicial power.
Contrary to the "internationalists" views are those of persons limiting
rules for the delineation of legislative and judicial jurisdiction to rules
enacted or accepted by the sovereign at the forum, whether by (a) legis-
lation, (b) treaty, or (c) acknowledgment of the force of international cus-
tom. The "territorialism" of J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THEI CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) is a typical example.
2. Thus some countries may assert jurisdiction on the basis of nationality
of the parties while others may require that the party or parties be
domiciliaries. Either of these would be reasonable criteria.
1968]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
In addition to the question of the two approaches to the
competency of states to exercise jurisdiction generally, there is
the problem of analyzing jurisdiction in its dual aspects. These
two aspects are legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdic-
tion. The criteria by which a state asserts jurisdiction in the
former need not be the same as in the latter. In certain matters
a state has the exclusive right to legislate for its citizens, and as
long as one remains a citizen he is subject to that law even if
temporarily absent. For example, state X may legislate as to
divorce for its citizens. Thus, in the matter of divorce, a citizen
of state X would be subject to its legislative jurisdiction even
if he were temporarily present in state Y. State Y would be
incompetent to assert legislative jurisdiction over him. On the
other hand, judicial jurisdiction, the power and authority to hear
a certain class of cases, does not ordinarily require as close
a nexus between an individual and a political unit as is required
for an individual to be subjected to its legislative jurisdiction.3
These two aspects of jurisdiction give rise to the following
question. Why, may not a state, lacking legislative jurisdiction,
grant a person a divorce in its courts if it applies the law of
the state which is competent to assert legislative jurisdiction?
If this were done, it would undoubtedly be superior to the
granting of a divorce by a state without legislative jurisdic-
tion applying its own law. One drawback to this approach is
that the forum state would not be as familiar with the law to
be applied as the enacting state itself would be. Also, there is
no guarantee that a court which is either very liberal or very
conservative in granting divorces under its own law would be
any less so because it was applying a different law.
With these observations in mind it may be helpful to analyze
the United States Supreme Court's approach to the problem
of legislative and judicial jurisdictional conflicts between the
states. Article IV, section 1 of the Federal Constitution provides:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
3. It is recognized, of course, that there are matters in which there
need be no special relationship between an individual and the state other
than physical presence for the state properly to assert both legislative and
judicial jurisdiction. An example is the criminal law. All persons, resident
and nonresident alike, present in a state, are subject to its laws prohibiting
criminal conduct and to action by its courts if they violate those laws.
See LA. CivIL CODE art. 9 (1870).
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manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effects thereof." Congress, however, has not
exercised the power thus granted to it to delineate the juris-
diction of states. If the bare full faith and credit clause were
taken literally, one might conclude that, Congress not having
acted to delineate the jurisdiction of states, all acts, records, and
judicial proceedings are entitled to full faith and credit in sister
states no matter how these acts or proceedings may interfere
with what is properly the concern of the sister state alone.
However, the Supreme Court recognized early that states are
limited in both legislative and judicial jurisdiction. In the absence
of constitutional and congressional directives the Court has
undertaken the task of discovering and articulating the rea-
sonable standards by which the legislative acts and judicial
proceedings of one state are to be considered entitled to full
faith and credit in other states.4
Usually, the Court has approached the problem of judicial
jurisdiction in recognition cases on the basis of a deprivation of
procedural due process. Lack of legislative jurisdiction, on the
other hand, has been dealt with in terms of a denial of substan-
tive due process. 5 The due process rationale, however, was not
really essential.6 The real problem lay in discovering jurisdic-
tional standards. The Court ultimately shifted its emphasis from
a due process context to one of full faith and credit.
What are the jurisdictional standards in a divorce proceed-
4. See Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CH.
L. REv. 775 (1955). In this article Professor Rheinstein maintains that the
basis upon which the Supreme Court limits jurisdiction of the states is
rooted in principles derived from the Law of Nations. This term is not
to be confused with international law as it is understood today. Rather,
the Law of Nations is a concept which traces its roots back to the Jus
gentium of the ancient Romans, and according to which there is a body
of legal principles applicable to all peoples and states. According to these
principles a state is limited in its assertion of jurisdiction. This was under-
stood by the framers of the Constitution, and this understanding is reflected
in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
5. For cases illustrative of these two approaches, respectively, see
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and Pink A.A.A. Highway Express,
Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
6. In the article cited in note 4 supra, Professor Rheinstein argues that
the due process rationale may not even be applicable In a divorce pro-
ceeding. He notes that the due process clause says that no one shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In what
sense may it be said that a divorce judgment alone deprives anyone of life,
liberty, or property, he asks. This question, it should be noted, assumes a
restrictive concept of property as opposed to the Lockian concept of
property as including all human Interests.
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ing? The Court has held that domicile7 is required to give a
state "jurisdiction." Before 1942 it was held generally that only
the state of the last matrimonial domicile was competent to
render a divorce.8 In Williams v. North Carolina (1942) 9 this
doctrine was overruled and it was asserted that if the plaintiff
is a bona fide domiciliary of a state, that state's courts may
grant him a divorce even from his non-domiciliary spouse if all
requirements of procedural due process are met.
It is important to note that in none of these decisions has
the Supreme Court separated, in express manner, the two aspects
of jurisdiction discussed above. Domicile has been viewed as
necessary to give a state both legislative and judicial jurisdic-
tion over a divorce proceeding. The dissenting judge in the
federal court of appeal case Alton v." Alton'O suggests that it
would be more desirable to keep these two aspects of the juris-
dictional problem separate. In his opinion a divorce may be
rendered by a state in which neither party is domiciled if it
will apply the law of the state of domicile. That this sugges-
tion has been ignored, if not implicitly rejected, by the Supreme
Court is reflected in the later case of Granville-Smith v. Gran-
ville-Smith" which was in effect an appeal from the Alton case.12
This identification of the legislative and judicial aspects of
divorce jurisdiction should not be considered a universal pheno-
menon. The laws of the many European countries clearly dis-
tinguish these two concepts. 8 In France, if parties of the same
nationality are seeking a divorce, their national law will be
applied. Conversely, French law governs the capacity of French
citizens to obtain a divorce in a foreign country.14 Similarly,
Dutch subjects may obtain a divorce in a foreign court having
judicial jurisdiction (according to its own law) if the divorce
7. "Domicile" is understood as physical presence in a state plus the
intention to make it one's permanent home. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1953).
8. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
9. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
10. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
11. 349 U.s. 1 (1955).
12. By the time Alton was appealed to the Supreme Court the question
had been rendered moot by the parties' securing a valid divorce in their
home state. Granville-Smith arose later with an essentially similar fact
situation. The court of appeal reached the same decision as in Alton, basing
its decision on that prior holding. Thus, the appeal of Granville-Smith to
the Supreme Court was in effect an appeal of the Alton case.
13. See generally, 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY ch. 11 (2d ed. 1958). Note especially the material beginning at 459.
14. G. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (1961).
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is based on grounds also recognized under Dutch law.15 As these
examples illustrate, some continental countries assert legisla-
tive jurisdiction over their absent citizens in the matter of
divorce while recognizing the judicial jurisdiction of foreign
countries. Also applying the separation of legislative and judicial
jurisdiction is the exequatur doctrine widely accepted by con-
tinental countries. Under this doctrine a country will give effect
to the judgment granted to one of its nationals by a foreign state
with judicial jurisdiction if it finds that under the same facts,
applying its own law, it would have reached the same decision.16
The above reflections suggest some conclusions about recog-
nition in the United States of foreign divorce judgments. It is
clear that, in principle, it is certainly reasonable to recognize
a divorce granted by a foreign court if the proper law was
applied and the court had proper judicial jurisdiction according
to acceptable standards of judicial due process. Thus it would
not be unreasonable for Louisiana to recognize a Mexican di-
vorce granted to Louisiana domiciliaries if the Louisiana sub-
stantive law were properly applied in a Mexican court having
judicial jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable
to recognize foreign divorces under the exequatur doctrine as
is done in some other countries. However, it does not seem
desirable that Louisiana should adopt less stringent standards
for recognition of foreign divorces than those imposed by the
full faith and credit clause as applied by the United States
Supreme Court for recognition of divorces granted in sister
states. Thus, while there are reasonable alternatives, the holding
in Clark v. Clark was perhaps the best solution to the problem.17
Philip R. Riegel, Jr.
15. R. HOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961).
16. This solution avoids one of the dangers inherent in the separation
of legislative and judicial jurisdiction-the misapplication of the applicable
law. On the detailed conditions for exequatur in France, see DALLoz, NOUVEAU
RhPERTOIRE DE DROIT, Jugement, §§ 214-224, 227 (2d ed. 1963); BATIFFOL, TRArr
ALPMENTAIRE DE DROIT nO 741 (3d ed. 1959).
17. It should be noted, however, that a draft convention on foreign
divorce recognition proposed by the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, to which the United States might become a party, would
provide for recognition of foreign divorces in instances in which recogni-
tion would not have to be given to divorces rendered in sister states.
Draft Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations,
adopted June 9, 1967, by the Special Commission of the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law.
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